mirror of
https://git.uploadfilter24.eu/lerentis/terraform-provider-gitea.git
synced 2024-11-06 02:38:13 +00:00
910ccdb092
Bumps [github.com/hashicorp/terraform-plugin-sdk/v2](https://github.com/hashicorp/terraform-plugin-sdk) from 2.26.1 to 2.27.0. - [Release notes](https://github.com/hashicorp/terraform-plugin-sdk/releases) - [Changelog](https://github.com/hashicorp/terraform-plugin-sdk/blob/main/CHANGELOG.md) - [Commits](https://github.com/hashicorp/terraform-plugin-sdk/compare/v2.26.1...v2.27.0) --- updated-dependencies: - dependency-name: github.com/hashicorp/terraform-plugin-sdk/v2 dependency-type: direct:production update-type: version-update:semver-minor ... Signed-off-by: dependabot[bot] <support@github.com>
1068 lines
33 KiB
Go
1068 lines
33 KiB
Go
// Copyright 2011 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
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// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
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// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
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package packet
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import (
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"bytes"
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"crypto"
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"crypto/dsa"
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"encoding/binary"
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"hash"
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"io"
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"strconv"
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"time"
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"github.com/ProtonMail/go-crypto/openpgp/ecdsa"
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"github.com/ProtonMail/go-crypto/openpgp/eddsa"
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"github.com/ProtonMail/go-crypto/openpgp/errors"
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"github.com/ProtonMail/go-crypto/openpgp/internal/algorithm"
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"github.com/ProtonMail/go-crypto/openpgp/internal/encoding"
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)
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const (
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// See RFC 4880, section 5.2.3.21 for details.
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KeyFlagCertify = 1 << iota
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KeyFlagSign
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KeyFlagEncryptCommunications
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KeyFlagEncryptStorage
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KeyFlagSplitKey
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KeyFlagAuthenticate
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_
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KeyFlagGroupKey
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)
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// Signature represents a signature. See RFC 4880, section 5.2.
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type Signature struct {
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Version int
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SigType SignatureType
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PubKeyAlgo PublicKeyAlgorithm
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Hash crypto.Hash
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// HashSuffix is extra data that is hashed in after the signed data.
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HashSuffix []byte
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// HashTag contains the first two bytes of the hash for fast rejection
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// of bad signed data.
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HashTag [2]byte
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// Metadata includes format, filename and time, and is protected by v5
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// signatures of type 0x00 or 0x01. This metadata is included into the hash
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// computation; if nil, six 0x00 bytes are used instead. See section 5.2.4.
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Metadata *LiteralData
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CreationTime time.Time
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RSASignature encoding.Field
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DSASigR, DSASigS encoding.Field
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ECDSASigR, ECDSASigS encoding.Field
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EdDSASigR, EdDSASigS encoding.Field
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// rawSubpackets contains the unparsed subpackets, in order.
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rawSubpackets []outputSubpacket
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// The following are optional so are nil when not included in the
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// signature.
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SigLifetimeSecs, KeyLifetimeSecs *uint32
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PreferredSymmetric, PreferredHash, PreferredCompression []uint8
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PreferredCipherSuites [][2]uint8
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IssuerKeyId *uint64
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IssuerFingerprint []byte
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SignerUserId *string
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IsPrimaryId *bool
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Notations []*Notation
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// TrustLevel and TrustAmount can be set by the signer to assert that
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// the key is not only valid but also trustworthy at the specified
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// level.
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// See RFC 4880, section 5.2.3.13 for details.
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TrustLevel TrustLevel
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TrustAmount TrustAmount
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// TrustRegularExpression can be used in conjunction with trust Signature
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// packets to limit the scope of the trust that is extended.
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// See RFC 4880, section 5.2.3.14 for details.
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TrustRegularExpression *string
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// PolicyURI can be set to the URI of a document that describes the
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// policy under which the signature was issued. See RFC 4880, section
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// 5.2.3.20 for details.
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PolicyURI string
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// FlagsValid is set if any flags were given. See RFC 4880, section
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// 5.2.3.21 for details.
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FlagsValid bool
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FlagCertify, FlagSign, FlagEncryptCommunications, FlagEncryptStorage, FlagSplitKey, FlagAuthenticate, FlagGroupKey bool
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// RevocationReason is set if this signature has been revoked.
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// See RFC 4880, section 5.2.3.23 for details.
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RevocationReason *ReasonForRevocation
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RevocationReasonText string
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// In a self-signature, these flags are set there is a features subpacket
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// indicating that the issuer implementation supports these features
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// see https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-openpgp-crypto-refresh#features-subpacket
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SEIPDv1, SEIPDv2 bool
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// EmbeddedSignature, if non-nil, is a signature of the parent key, by
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// this key. This prevents an attacker from claiming another's signing
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// subkey as their own.
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EmbeddedSignature *Signature
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outSubpackets []outputSubpacket
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}
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func (sig *Signature) parse(r io.Reader) (err error) {
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// RFC 4880, section 5.2.3
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var buf [5]byte
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_, err = readFull(r, buf[:1])
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if err != nil {
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return
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}
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if buf[0] != 4 && buf[0] != 5 {
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err = errors.UnsupportedError("signature packet version " + strconv.Itoa(int(buf[0])))
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return
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}
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sig.Version = int(buf[0])
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_, err = readFull(r, buf[:5])
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if err != nil {
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return
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}
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sig.SigType = SignatureType(buf[0])
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sig.PubKeyAlgo = PublicKeyAlgorithm(buf[1])
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switch sig.PubKeyAlgo {
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case PubKeyAlgoRSA, PubKeyAlgoRSASignOnly, PubKeyAlgoDSA, PubKeyAlgoECDSA, PubKeyAlgoEdDSA:
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default:
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err = errors.UnsupportedError("public key algorithm " + strconv.Itoa(int(sig.PubKeyAlgo)))
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return
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}
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var ok bool
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if sig.Version < 5 {
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sig.Hash, ok = algorithm.HashIdToHashWithSha1(buf[2])
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} else {
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sig.Hash, ok = algorithm.HashIdToHash(buf[2])
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}
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if !ok {
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return errors.UnsupportedError("hash function " + strconv.Itoa(int(buf[2])))
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}
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hashedSubpacketsLength := int(buf[3])<<8 | int(buf[4])
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hashedSubpackets := make([]byte, hashedSubpacketsLength)
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_, err = readFull(r, hashedSubpackets)
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if err != nil {
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return
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}
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err = sig.buildHashSuffix(hashedSubpackets)
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if err != nil {
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return
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}
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err = parseSignatureSubpackets(sig, hashedSubpackets, true)
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if err != nil {
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return
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}
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_, err = readFull(r, buf[:2])
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if err != nil {
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return
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}
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unhashedSubpacketsLength := int(buf[0])<<8 | int(buf[1])
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unhashedSubpackets := make([]byte, unhashedSubpacketsLength)
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_, err = readFull(r, unhashedSubpackets)
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if err != nil {
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return
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}
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err = parseSignatureSubpackets(sig, unhashedSubpackets, false)
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if err != nil {
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return
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}
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_, err = readFull(r, sig.HashTag[:2])
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if err != nil {
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return
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}
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switch sig.PubKeyAlgo {
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case PubKeyAlgoRSA, PubKeyAlgoRSASignOnly:
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sig.RSASignature = new(encoding.MPI)
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_, err = sig.RSASignature.ReadFrom(r)
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case PubKeyAlgoDSA:
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sig.DSASigR = new(encoding.MPI)
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if _, err = sig.DSASigR.ReadFrom(r); err != nil {
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return
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}
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sig.DSASigS = new(encoding.MPI)
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_, err = sig.DSASigS.ReadFrom(r)
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case PubKeyAlgoECDSA:
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sig.ECDSASigR = new(encoding.MPI)
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if _, err = sig.ECDSASigR.ReadFrom(r); err != nil {
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return
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}
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sig.ECDSASigS = new(encoding.MPI)
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_, err = sig.ECDSASigS.ReadFrom(r)
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case PubKeyAlgoEdDSA:
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sig.EdDSASigR = new(encoding.MPI)
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if _, err = sig.EdDSASigR.ReadFrom(r); err != nil {
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return
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}
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sig.EdDSASigS = new(encoding.MPI)
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if _, err = sig.EdDSASigS.ReadFrom(r); err != nil {
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return
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}
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default:
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panic("unreachable")
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}
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return
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}
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// parseSignatureSubpackets parses subpackets of the main signature packet. See
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// RFC 4880, section 5.2.3.1.
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func parseSignatureSubpackets(sig *Signature, subpackets []byte, isHashed bool) (err error) {
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for len(subpackets) > 0 {
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subpackets, err = parseSignatureSubpacket(sig, subpackets, isHashed)
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if err != nil {
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return
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}
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}
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if sig.CreationTime.IsZero() {
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err = errors.StructuralError("no creation time in signature")
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}
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return
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}
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type signatureSubpacketType uint8
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const (
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creationTimeSubpacket signatureSubpacketType = 2
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signatureExpirationSubpacket signatureSubpacketType = 3
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trustSubpacket signatureSubpacketType = 5
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regularExpressionSubpacket signatureSubpacketType = 6
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keyExpirationSubpacket signatureSubpacketType = 9
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prefSymmetricAlgosSubpacket signatureSubpacketType = 11
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issuerSubpacket signatureSubpacketType = 16
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notationDataSubpacket signatureSubpacketType = 20
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prefHashAlgosSubpacket signatureSubpacketType = 21
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prefCompressionSubpacket signatureSubpacketType = 22
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primaryUserIdSubpacket signatureSubpacketType = 25
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policyUriSubpacket signatureSubpacketType = 26
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keyFlagsSubpacket signatureSubpacketType = 27
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signerUserIdSubpacket signatureSubpacketType = 28
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reasonForRevocationSubpacket signatureSubpacketType = 29
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featuresSubpacket signatureSubpacketType = 30
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embeddedSignatureSubpacket signatureSubpacketType = 32
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issuerFingerprintSubpacket signatureSubpacketType = 33
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prefCipherSuitesSubpacket signatureSubpacketType = 39
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)
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// parseSignatureSubpacket parses a single subpacket. len(subpacket) is >= 1.
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func parseSignatureSubpacket(sig *Signature, subpacket []byte, isHashed bool) (rest []byte, err error) {
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// RFC 4880, section 5.2.3.1
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var (
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length uint32
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packetType signatureSubpacketType
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isCritical bool
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)
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switch {
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case subpacket[0] < 192:
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length = uint32(subpacket[0])
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subpacket = subpacket[1:]
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case subpacket[0] < 255:
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if len(subpacket) < 2 {
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goto Truncated
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}
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length = uint32(subpacket[0]-192)<<8 + uint32(subpacket[1]) + 192
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subpacket = subpacket[2:]
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default:
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if len(subpacket) < 5 {
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goto Truncated
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}
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length = uint32(subpacket[1])<<24 |
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uint32(subpacket[2])<<16 |
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uint32(subpacket[3])<<8 |
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uint32(subpacket[4])
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subpacket = subpacket[5:]
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}
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if length > uint32(len(subpacket)) {
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goto Truncated
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}
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rest = subpacket[length:]
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subpacket = subpacket[:length]
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if len(subpacket) == 0 {
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err = errors.StructuralError("zero length signature subpacket")
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return
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}
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packetType = signatureSubpacketType(subpacket[0] & 0x7f)
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isCritical = subpacket[0]&0x80 == 0x80
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subpacket = subpacket[1:]
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sig.rawSubpackets = append(sig.rawSubpackets, outputSubpacket{isHashed, packetType, isCritical, subpacket})
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if !isHashed &&
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packetType != issuerSubpacket &&
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packetType != issuerFingerprintSubpacket &&
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packetType != embeddedSignatureSubpacket {
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return
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}
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switch packetType {
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case creationTimeSubpacket:
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if len(subpacket) != 4 {
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err = errors.StructuralError("signature creation time not four bytes")
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return
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}
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t := binary.BigEndian.Uint32(subpacket)
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sig.CreationTime = time.Unix(int64(t), 0)
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case signatureExpirationSubpacket:
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// Signature expiration time, section 5.2.3.10
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if len(subpacket) != 4 {
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err = errors.StructuralError("expiration subpacket with bad length")
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return
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}
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sig.SigLifetimeSecs = new(uint32)
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*sig.SigLifetimeSecs = binary.BigEndian.Uint32(subpacket)
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case trustSubpacket:
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// Trust level and amount, section 5.2.3.13
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sig.TrustLevel = TrustLevel(subpacket[0])
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sig.TrustAmount = TrustAmount(subpacket[1])
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case regularExpressionSubpacket:
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// Trust regular expression, section 5.2.3.14
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// RFC specifies the string should be null-terminated; remove a null byte from the end
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if subpacket[len(subpacket)-1] != 0x00 {
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err = errors.StructuralError("expected regular expression to be null-terminated")
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return
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}
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trustRegularExpression := string(subpacket[:len(subpacket)-1])
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sig.TrustRegularExpression = &trustRegularExpression
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case keyExpirationSubpacket:
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// Key expiration time, section 5.2.3.6
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if len(subpacket) != 4 {
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err = errors.StructuralError("key expiration subpacket with bad length")
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return
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}
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sig.KeyLifetimeSecs = new(uint32)
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*sig.KeyLifetimeSecs = binary.BigEndian.Uint32(subpacket)
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case prefSymmetricAlgosSubpacket:
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// Preferred symmetric algorithms, section 5.2.3.7
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sig.PreferredSymmetric = make([]byte, len(subpacket))
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copy(sig.PreferredSymmetric, subpacket)
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case issuerSubpacket:
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// Issuer, section 5.2.3.5
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if sig.Version > 4 {
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err = errors.StructuralError("issuer subpacket found in v5 key")
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return
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}
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if len(subpacket) != 8 {
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err = errors.StructuralError("issuer subpacket with bad length")
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return
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}
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sig.IssuerKeyId = new(uint64)
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*sig.IssuerKeyId = binary.BigEndian.Uint64(subpacket)
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case notationDataSubpacket:
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// Notation data, section 5.2.3.16
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if len(subpacket) < 8 {
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err = errors.StructuralError("notation data subpacket with bad length")
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return
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}
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nameLength := uint32(subpacket[4])<<8 | uint32(subpacket[5])
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valueLength := uint32(subpacket[6])<<8 | uint32(subpacket[7])
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if len(subpacket) != int(nameLength) + int(valueLength) + 8 {
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err = errors.StructuralError("notation data subpacket with bad length")
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return
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}
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notation := Notation{
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IsHumanReadable: (subpacket[0] & 0x80) == 0x80,
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Name: string(subpacket[8: (nameLength + 8)]),
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Value: subpacket[(nameLength + 8) : (valueLength + nameLength + 8)],
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IsCritical: isCritical,
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}
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sig.Notations = append(sig.Notations, ¬ation)
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case prefHashAlgosSubpacket:
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// Preferred hash algorithms, section 5.2.3.8
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sig.PreferredHash = make([]byte, len(subpacket))
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copy(sig.PreferredHash, subpacket)
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case prefCompressionSubpacket:
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// Preferred compression algorithms, section 5.2.3.9
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sig.PreferredCompression = make([]byte, len(subpacket))
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copy(sig.PreferredCompression, subpacket)
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case primaryUserIdSubpacket:
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// Primary User ID, section 5.2.3.19
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if len(subpacket) != 1 {
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err = errors.StructuralError("primary user id subpacket with bad length")
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return
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}
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sig.IsPrimaryId = new(bool)
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if subpacket[0] > 0 {
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*sig.IsPrimaryId = true
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}
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case keyFlagsSubpacket:
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// Key flags, section 5.2.3.21
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if len(subpacket) == 0 {
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err = errors.StructuralError("empty key flags subpacket")
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return
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}
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sig.FlagsValid = true
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if subpacket[0]&KeyFlagCertify != 0 {
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sig.FlagCertify = true
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}
|
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if subpacket[0]&KeyFlagSign != 0 {
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sig.FlagSign = true
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}
|
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if subpacket[0]&KeyFlagEncryptCommunications != 0 {
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sig.FlagEncryptCommunications = true
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}
|
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if subpacket[0]&KeyFlagEncryptStorage != 0 {
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sig.FlagEncryptStorage = true
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}
|
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if subpacket[0]&KeyFlagSplitKey != 0 {
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sig.FlagSplitKey = true
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}
|
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if subpacket[0]&KeyFlagAuthenticate != 0 {
|
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sig.FlagAuthenticate = true
|
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}
|
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if subpacket[0]&KeyFlagGroupKey != 0 {
|
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sig.FlagGroupKey = true
|
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}
|
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case signerUserIdSubpacket:
|
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userId := string(subpacket)
|
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sig.SignerUserId = &userId
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case reasonForRevocationSubpacket:
|
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// Reason For Revocation, section 5.2.3.23
|
|
if len(subpacket) == 0 {
|
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err = errors.StructuralError("empty revocation reason subpacket")
|
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return
|
|
}
|
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sig.RevocationReason = new(ReasonForRevocation)
|
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*sig.RevocationReason = ReasonForRevocation(subpacket[0])
|
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sig.RevocationReasonText = string(subpacket[1:])
|
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case featuresSubpacket:
|
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// Features subpacket, section 5.2.3.24 specifies a very general
|
|
// mechanism for OpenPGP implementations to signal support for new
|
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// features.
|
|
if len(subpacket) > 0 {
|
|
if subpacket[0]&0x01 != 0 {
|
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sig.SEIPDv1 = true
|
|
}
|
|
// 0x02 and 0x04 are reserved
|
|
if subpacket[0]&0x08 != 0 {
|
|
sig.SEIPDv2 = true
|
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}
|
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}
|
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case embeddedSignatureSubpacket:
|
|
// Only usage is in signatures that cross-certify
|
|
// signing subkeys. section 5.2.3.26 describes the
|
|
// format, with its usage described in section 11.1
|
|
if sig.EmbeddedSignature != nil {
|
|
err = errors.StructuralError("Cannot have multiple embedded signatures")
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
sig.EmbeddedSignature = new(Signature)
|
|
// Embedded signatures are required to be v4 signatures see
|
|
// section 12.1. However, we only parse v4 signatures in this
|
|
// file anyway.
|
|
if err := sig.EmbeddedSignature.parse(bytes.NewBuffer(subpacket)); err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
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}
|
|
if sigType := sig.EmbeddedSignature.SigType; sigType != SigTypePrimaryKeyBinding {
|
|
return nil, errors.StructuralError("cross-signature has unexpected type " + strconv.Itoa(int(sigType)))
|
|
}
|
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case policyUriSubpacket:
|
|
// Policy URI, section 5.2.3.20
|
|
sig.PolicyURI = string(subpacket)
|
|
case issuerFingerprintSubpacket:
|
|
v, l := subpacket[0], len(subpacket[1:])
|
|
if v == 5 && l != 32 || v != 5 && l != 20 {
|
|
return nil, errors.StructuralError("bad fingerprint length")
|
|
}
|
|
sig.IssuerFingerprint = make([]byte, l)
|
|
copy(sig.IssuerFingerprint, subpacket[1:])
|
|
sig.IssuerKeyId = new(uint64)
|
|
if v == 5 {
|
|
*sig.IssuerKeyId = binary.BigEndian.Uint64(subpacket[1:9])
|
|
} else {
|
|
*sig.IssuerKeyId = binary.BigEndian.Uint64(subpacket[13:21])
|
|
}
|
|
case prefCipherSuitesSubpacket:
|
|
// Preferred AEAD cipher suites
|
|
// See https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-openpgp-crypto-refresh-07.html#name-preferred-aead-ciphersuites
|
|
if len(subpacket) % 2 != 0 {
|
|
err = errors.StructuralError("invalid aead cipher suite length")
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
sig.PreferredCipherSuites = make([][2]byte, len(subpacket) / 2)
|
|
|
|
for i := 0; i < len(subpacket) / 2; i++ {
|
|
sig.PreferredCipherSuites[i] = [2]uint8{subpacket[2*i], subpacket[2*i+1]}
|
|
}
|
|
default:
|
|
if isCritical {
|
|
err = errors.UnsupportedError("unknown critical signature subpacket type " + strconv.Itoa(int(packetType)))
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return
|
|
|
|
Truncated:
|
|
err = errors.StructuralError("signature subpacket truncated")
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// subpacketLengthLength returns the length, in bytes, of an encoded length value.
|
|
func subpacketLengthLength(length int) int {
|
|
if length < 192 {
|
|
return 1
|
|
}
|
|
if length < 16320 {
|
|
return 2
|
|
}
|
|
return 5
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (sig *Signature) CheckKeyIdOrFingerprint(pk *PublicKey) bool {
|
|
if sig.IssuerFingerprint != nil && len(sig.IssuerFingerprint) >= 20 {
|
|
return bytes.Equal(sig.IssuerFingerprint, pk.Fingerprint)
|
|
}
|
|
return sig.IssuerKeyId != nil && *sig.IssuerKeyId == pk.KeyId
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// serializeSubpacketLength marshals the given length into to.
|
|
func serializeSubpacketLength(to []byte, length int) int {
|
|
// RFC 4880, Section 4.2.2.
|
|
if length < 192 {
|
|
to[0] = byte(length)
|
|
return 1
|
|
}
|
|
if length < 16320 {
|
|
length -= 192
|
|
to[0] = byte((length >> 8) + 192)
|
|
to[1] = byte(length)
|
|
return 2
|
|
}
|
|
to[0] = 255
|
|
to[1] = byte(length >> 24)
|
|
to[2] = byte(length >> 16)
|
|
to[3] = byte(length >> 8)
|
|
to[4] = byte(length)
|
|
return 5
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// subpacketsLength returns the serialized length, in bytes, of the given
|
|
// subpackets.
|
|
func subpacketsLength(subpackets []outputSubpacket, hashed bool) (length int) {
|
|
for _, subpacket := range subpackets {
|
|
if subpacket.hashed == hashed {
|
|
length += subpacketLengthLength(len(subpacket.contents) + 1)
|
|
length += 1 // type byte
|
|
length += len(subpacket.contents)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// serializeSubpackets marshals the given subpackets into to.
|
|
func serializeSubpackets(to []byte, subpackets []outputSubpacket, hashed bool) {
|
|
for _, subpacket := range subpackets {
|
|
if subpacket.hashed == hashed {
|
|
n := serializeSubpacketLength(to, len(subpacket.contents)+1)
|
|
to[n] = byte(subpacket.subpacketType)
|
|
if subpacket.isCritical {
|
|
to[n] |= 0x80
|
|
}
|
|
to = to[1+n:]
|
|
n = copy(to, subpacket.contents)
|
|
to = to[n:]
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// SigExpired returns whether sig is a signature that has expired or is created
|
|
// in the future.
|
|
func (sig *Signature) SigExpired(currentTime time.Time) bool {
|
|
if sig.CreationTime.After(currentTime) {
|
|
return true
|
|
}
|
|
if sig.SigLifetimeSecs == nil || *sig.SigLifetimeSecs == 0 {
|
|
return false
|
|
}
|
|
expiry := sig.CreationTime.Add(time.Duration(*sig.SigLifetimeSecs) * time.Second)
|
|
return currentTime.After(expiry)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// buildHashSuffix constructs the HashSuffix member of sig in preparation for signing.
|
|
func (sig *Signature) buildHashSuffix(hashedSubpackets []byte) (err error) {
|
|
var hashId byte
|
|
var ok bool
|
|
|
|
if sig.Version < 5 {
|
|
hashId, ok = algorithm.HashToHashIdWithSha1(sig.Hash)
|
|
} else {
|
|
hashId, ok = algorithm.HashToHashId(sig.Hash)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
sig.HashSuffix = nil
|
|
return errors.InvalidArgumentError("hash cannot be represented in OpenPGP: " + strconv.Itoa(int(sig.Hash)))
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
hashedFields := bytes.NewBuffer([]byte{
|
|
uint8(sig.Version),
|
|
uint8(sig.SigType),
|
|
uint8(sig.PubKeyAlgo),
|
|
uint8(hashId),
|
|
uint8(len(hashedSubpackets) >> 8),
|
|
uint8(len(hashedSubpackets)),
|
|
})
|
|
hashedFields.Write(hashedSubpackets)
|
|
|
|
var l uint64 = uint64(6 + len(hashedSubpackets))
|
|
if sig.Version == 5 {
|
|
hashedFields.Write([]byte{0x05, 0xff})
|
|
hashedFields.Write([]byte{
|
|
uint8(l >> 56), uint8(l >> 48), uint8(l >> 40), uint8(l >> 32),
|
|
uint8(l >> 24), uint8(l >> 16), uint8(l >> 8), uint8(l),
|
|
})
|
|
} else {
|
|
hashedFields.Write([]byte{0x04, 0xff})
|
|
hashedFields.Write([]byte{
|
|
uint8(l >> 24), uint8(l >> 16), uint8(l >> 8), uint8(l),
|
|
})
|
|
}
|
|
sig.HashSuffix = make([]byte, hashedFields.Len())
|
|
copy(sig.HashSuffix, hashedFields.Bytes())
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (sig *Signature) signPrepareHash(h hash.Hash) (digest []byte, err error) {
|
|
hashedSubpacketsLen := subpacketsLength(sig.outSubpackets, true)
|
|
hashedSubpackets := make([]byte, hashedSubpacketsLen)
|
|
serializeSubpackets(hashedSubpackets, sig.outSubpackets, true)
|
|
err = sig.buildHashSuffix(hashedSubpackets)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
if sig.Version == 5 && (sig.SigType == 0x00 || sig.SigType == 0x01) {
|
|
sig.AddMetadataToHashSuffix()
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
h.Write(sig.HashSuffix)
|
|
digest = h.Sum(nil)
|
|
copy(sig.HashTag[:], digest)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Sign signs a message with a private key. The hash, h, must contain
|
|
// the hash of the message to be signed and will be mutated by this function.
|
|
// On success, the signature is stored in sig. Call Serialize to write it out.
|
|
// If config is nil, sensible defaults will be used.
|
|
func (sig *Signature) Sign(h hash.Hash, priv *PrivateKey, config *Config) (err error) {
|
|
if priv.Dummy() {
|
|
return errors.ErrDummyPrivateKey("dummy key found")
|
|
}
|
|
sig.Version = priv.PublicKey.Version
|
|
sig.IssuerFingerprint = priv.PublicKey.Fingerprint
|
|
sig.outSubpackets, err = sig.buildSubpackets(priv.PublicKey)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
digest, err := sig.signPrepareHash(h)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
switch priv.PubKeyAlgo {
|
|
case PubKeyAlgoRSA, PubKeyAlgoRSASignOnly:
|
|
// supports both *rsa.PrivateKey and crypto.Signer
|
|
sigdata, err := priv.PrivateKey.(crypto.Signer).Sign(config.Random(), digest, sig.Hash)
|
|
if err == nil {
|
|
sig.RSASignature = encoding.NewMPI(sigdata)
|
|
}
|
|
case PubKeyAlgoDSA:
|
|
dsaPriv := priv.PrivateKey.(*dsa.PrivateKey)
|
|
|
|
// Need to truncate hashBytes to match FIPS 186-3 section 4.6.
|
|
subgroupSize := (dsaPriv.Q.BitLen() + 7) / 8
|
|
if len(digest) > subgroupSize {
|
|
digest = digest[:subgroupSize]
|
|
}
|
|
r, s, err := dsa.Sign(config.Random(), dsaPriv, digest)
|
|
if err == nil {
|
|
sig.DSASigR = new(encoding.MPI).SetBig(r)
|
|
sig.DSASigS = new(encoding.MPI).SetBig(s)
|
|
}
|
|
case PubKeyAlgoECDSA:
|
|
sk := priv.PrivateKey.(*ecdsa.PrivateKey)
|
|
r, s, err := ecdsa.Sign(config.Random(), sk, digest)
|
|
|
|
if err == nil {
|
|
sig.ECDSASigR = new(encoding.MPI).SetBig(r)
|
|
sig.ECDSASigS = new(encoding.MPI).SetBig(s)
|
|
}
|
|
case PubKeyAlgoEdDSA:
|
|
sk := priv.PrivateKey.(*eddsa.PrivateKey)
|
|
r, s, err := eddsa.Sign(sk, digest)
|
|
if err == nil {
|
|
sig.EdDSASigR = encoding.NewMPI(r)
|
|
sig.EdDSASigS = encoding.NewMPI(s)
|
|
}
|
|
default:
|
|
err = errors.UnsupportedError("public key algorithm: " + strconv.Itoa(int(sig.PubKeyAlgo)))
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// SignUserId computes a signature from priv, asserting that pub is a valid
|
|
// key for the identity id. On success, the signature is stored in sig. Call
|
|
// Serialize to write it out.
|
|
// If config is nil, sensible defaults will be used.
|
|
func (sig *Signature) SignUserId(id string, pub *PublicKey, priv *PrivateKey, config *Config) error {
|
|
if priv.Dummy() {
|
|
return errors.ErrDummyPrivateKey("dummy key found")
|
|
}
|
|
h, err := userIdSignatureHash(id, pub, sig.Hash)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
return sig.Sign(h, priv, config)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// CrossSignKey computes a signature from signingKey on pub hashed using hashKey. On success,
|
|
// the signature is stored in sig. Call Serialize to write it out.
|
|
// If config is nil, sensible defaults will be used.
|
|
func (sig *Signature) CrossSignKey(pub *PublicKey, hashKey *PublicKey, signingKey *PrivateKey,
|
|
config *Config) error {
|
|
h, err := keySignatureHash(hashKey, pub, sig.Hash)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
return sig.Sign(h, signingKey, config)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// SignKey computes a signature from priv, asserting that pub is a subkey. On
|
|
// success, the signature is stored in sig. Call Serialize to write it out.
|
|
// If config is nil, sensible defaults will be used.
|
|
func (sig *Signature) SignKey(pub *PublicKey, priv *PrivateKey, config *Config) error {
|
|
if priv.Dummy() {
|
|
return errors.ErrDummyPrivateKey("dummy key found")
|
|
}
|
|
h, err := keySignatureHash(&priv.PublicKey, pub, sig.Hash)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
return sig.Sign(h, priv, config)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// RevokeKey computes a revocation signature of pub using priv. On success, the signature is
|
|
// stored in sig. Call Serialize to write it out.
|
|
// If config is nil, sensible defaults will be used.
|
|
func (sig *Signature) RevokeKey(pub *PublicKey, priv *PrivateKey, config *Config) error {
|
|
h, err := keyRevocationHash(pub, sig.Hash)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
return sig.Sign(h, priv, config)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// RevokeSubkey computes a subkey revocation signature of pub using priv.
|
|
// On success, the signature is stored in sig. Call Serialize to write it out.
|
|
// If config is nil, sensible defaults will be used.
|
|
func (sig *Signature) RevokeSubkey(pub *PublicKey, priv *PrivateKey, config *Config) error {
|
|
// Identical to a subkey binding signature
|
|
return sig.SignKey(pub, priv, config)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Serialize marshals sig to w. Sign, SignUserId or SignKey must have been
|
|
// called first.
|
|
func (sig *Signature) Serialize(w io.Writer) (err error) {
|
|
if len(sig.outSubpackets) == 0 {
|
|
sig.outSubpackets = sig.rawSubpackets
|
|
}
|
|
if sig.RSASignature == nil && sig.DSASigR == nil && sig.ECDSASigR == nil && sig.EdDSASigR == nil {
|
|
return errors.InvalidArgumentError("Signature: need to call Sign, SignUserId or SignKey before Serialize")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
sigLength := 0
|
|
switch sig.PubKeyAlgo {
|
|
case PubKeyAlgoRSA, PubKeyAlgoRSASignOnly:
|
|
sigLength = int(sig.RSASignature.EncodedLength())
|
|
case PubKeyAlgoDSA:
|
|
sigLength = int(sig.DSASigR.EncodedLength())
|
|
sigLength += int(sig.DSASigS.EncodedLength())
|
|
case PubKeyAlgoECDSA:
|
|
sigLength = int(sig.ECDSASigR.EncodedLength())
|
|
sigLength += int(sig.ECDSASigS.EncodedLength())
|
|
case PubKeyAlgoEdDSA:
|
|
sigLength = int(sig.EdDSASigR.EncodedLength())
|
|
sigLength += int(sig.EdDSASigS.EncodedLength())
|
|
default:
|
|
panic("impossible")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
unhashedSubpacketsLen := subpacketsLength(sig.outSubpackets, false)
|
|
length := len(sig.HashSuffix) - 6 /* trailer not included */ +
|
|
2 /* length of unhashed subpackets */ + unhashedSubpacketsLen +
|
|
2 /* hash tag */ + sigLength
|
|
if sig.Version == 5 {
|
|
length -= 4 // eight-octet instead of four-octet big endian
|
|
}
|
|
err = serializeHeader(w, packetTypeSignature, length)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
err = sig.serializeBody(w)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (sig *Signature) serializeBody(w io.Writer) (err error) {
|
|
hashedSubpacketsLen := uint16(uint16(sig.HashSuffix[4])<<8) | uint16(sig.HashSuffix[5])
|
|
fields := sig.HashSuffix[:6+hashedSubpacketsLen]
|
|
_, err = w.Write(fields)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
unhashedSubpacketsLen := subpacketsLength(sig.outSubpackets, false)
|
|
unhashedSubpackets := make([]byte, 2+unhashedSubpacketsLen)
|
|
unhashedSubpackets[0] = byte(unhashedSubpacketsLen >> 8)
|
|
unhashedSubpackets[1] = byte(unhashedSubpacketsLen)
|
|
serializeSubpackets(unhashedSubpackets[2:], sig.outSubpackets, false)
|
|
|
|
_, err = w.Write(unhashedSubpackets)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
_, err = w.Write(sig.HashTag[:])
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
switch sig.PubKeyAlgo {
|
|
case PubKeyAlgoRSA, PubKeyAlgoRSASignOnly:
|
|
_, err = w.Write(sig.RSASignature.EncodedBytes())
|
|
case PubKeyAlgoDSA:
|
|
if _, err = w.Write(sig.DSASigR.EncodedBytes()); err != nil {
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
_, err = w.Write(sig.DSASigS.EncodedBytes())
|
|
case PubKeyAlgoECDSA:
|
|
if _, err = w.Write(sig.ECDSASigR.EncodedBytes()); err != nil {
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
_, err = w.Write(sig.ECDSASigS.EncodedBytes())
|
|
case PubKeyAlgoEdDSA:
|
|
if _, err = w.Write(sig.EdDSASigR.EncodedBytes()); err != nil {
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
_, err = w.Write(sig.EdDSASigS.EncodedBytes())
|
|
default:
|
|
panic("impossible")
|
|
}
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// outputSubpacket represents a subpacket to be marshaled.
|
|
type outputSubpacket struct {
|
|
hashed bool // true if this subpacket is in the hashed area.
|
|
subpacketType signatureSubpacketType
|
|
isCritical bool
|
|
contents []byte
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (sig *Signature) buildSubpackets(issuer PublicKey) (subpackets []outputSubpacket, err error) {
|
|
creationTime := make([]byte, 4)
|
|
binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(creationTime, uint32(sig.CreationTime.Unix()))
|
|
subpackets = append(subpackets, outputSubpacket{true, creationTimeSubpacket, false, creationTime})
|
|
|
|
if sig.IssuerKeyId != nil && sig.Version == 4 {
|
|
keyId := make([]byte, 8)
|
|
binary.BigEndian.PutUint64(keyId, *sig.IssuerKeyId)
|
|
subpackets = append(subpackets, outputSubpacket{true, issuerSubpacket, true, keyId})
|
|
}
|
|
if sig.IssuerFingerprint != nil {
|
|
contents := append([]uint8{uint8(issuer.Version)}, sig.IssuerFingerprint...)
|
|
subpackets = append(subpackets, outputSubpacket{true, issuerFingerprintSubpacket, sig.Version == 5, contents})
|
|
}
|
|
if sig.SignerUserId != nil {
|
|
subpackets = append(subpackets, outputSubpacket{true, signerUserIdSubpacket, false, []byte(*sig.SignerUserId)})
|
|
}
|
|
if sig.SigLifetimeSecs != nil && *sig.SigLifetimeSecs != 0 {
|
|
sigLifetime := make([]byte, 4)
|
|
binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(sigLifetime, *sig.SigLifetimeSecs)
|
|
subpackets = append(subpackets, outputSubpacket{true, signatureExpirationSubpacket, true, sigLifetime})
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Key flags may only appear in self-signatures or certification signatures.
|
|
|
|
if sig.FlagsValid {
|
|
var flags byte
|
|
if sig.FlagCertify {
|
|
flags |= KeyFlagCertify
|
|
}
|
|
if sig.FlagSign {
|
|
flags |= KeyFlagSign
|
|
}
|
|
if sig.FlagEncryptCommunications {
|
|
flags |= KeyFlagEncryptCommunications
|
|
}
|
|
if sig.FlagEncryptStorage {
|
|
flags |= KeyFlagEncryptStorage
|
|
}
|
|
if sig.FlagSplitKey {
|
|
flags |= KeyFlagSplitKey
|
|
}
|
|
if sig.FlagAuthenticate {
|
|
flags |= KeyFlagAuthenticate
|
|
}
|
|
if sig.FlagGroupKey {
|
|
flags |= KeyFlagGroupKey
|
|
}
|
|
subpackets = append(subpackets, outputSubpacket{true, keyFlagsSubpacket, false, []byte{flags}})
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
for _, notation := range sig.Notations {
|
|
subpackets = append(
|
|
subpackets,
|
|
outputSubpacket{
|
|
true,
|
|
notationDataSubpacket,
|
|
notation.IsCritical,
|
|
notation.getData(),
|
|
})
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// The following subpackets may only appear in self-signatures.
|
|
|
|
var features = byte(0x00)
|
|
if sig.SEIPDv1 {
|
|
features |= 0x01
|
|
}
|
|
if sig.SEIPDv2 {
|
|
features |= 0x08
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if features != 0x00 {
|
|
subpackets = append(subpackets, outputSubpacket{true, featuresSubpacket, false, []byte{features}})
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if sig.TrustLevel != 0 {
|
|
subpackets = append(subpackets, outputSubpacket{true, trustSubpacket, true, []byte{byte(sig.TrustLevel), byte(sig.TrustAmount)}})
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if sig.TrustRegularExpression != nil {
|
|
// RFC specifies the string should be null-terminated; add a null byte to the end
|
|
subpackets = append(subpackets, outputSubpacket{true, regularExpressionSubpacket, true, []byte(*sig.TrustRegularExpression + "\000")})
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if sig.KeyLifetimeSecs != nil && *sig.KeyLifetimeSecs != 0 {
|
|
keyLifetime := make([]byte, 4)
|
|
binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(keyLifetime, *sig.KeyLifetimeSecs)
|
|
subpackets = append(subpackets, outputSubpacket{true, keyExpirationSubpacket, true, keyLifetime})
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if sig.IsPrimaryId != nil && *sig.IsPrimaryId {
|
|
subpackets = append(subpackets, outputSubpacket{true, primaryUserIdSubpacket, false, []byte{1}})
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if len(sig.PreferredSymmetric) > 0 {
|
|
subpackets = append(subpackets, outputSubpacket{true, prefSymmetricAlgosSubpacket, false, sig.PreferredSymmetric})
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if len(sig.PreferredHash) > 0 {
|
|
subpackets = append(subpackets, outputSubpacket{true, prefHashAlgosSubpacket, false, sig.PreferredHash})
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if len(sig.PreferredCompression) > 0 {
|
|
subpackets = append(subpackets, outputSubpacket{true, prefCompressionSubpacket, false, sig.PreferredCompression})
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if len(sig.PolicyURI) > 0 {
|
|
subpackets = append(subpackets, outputSubpacket{true, policyUriSubpacket, false, []uint8(sig.PolicyURI)})
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if len(sig.PreferredCipherSuites) > 0 {
|
|
serialized := make([]byte, len(sig.PreferredCipherSuites)*2)
|
|
for i, cipherSuite := range sig.PreferredCipherSuites {
|
|
serialized[2*i] = cipherSuite[0]
|
|
serialized[2*i+1] = cipherSuite[1]
|
|
}
|
|
subpackets = append(subpackets, outputSubpacket{true, prefCipherSuitesSubpacket, false, serialized})
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Revocation reason appears only in revocation signatures and is serialized as per section 5.2.3.23.
|
|
if sig.RevocationReason != nil {
|
|
subpackets = append(subpackets, outputSubpacket{true, reasonForRevocationSubpacket, true,
|
|
append([]uint8{uint8(*sig.RevocationReason)}, []uint8(sig.RevocationReasonText)...)})
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// EmbeddedSignature appears only in subkeys capable of signing and is serialized as per section 5.2.3.26.
|
|
if sig.EmbeddedSignature != nil {
|
|
var buf bytes.Buffer
|
|
err = sig.EmbeddedSignature.serializeBody(&buf)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
subpackets = append(subpackets, outputSubpacket{true, embeddedSignatureSubpacket, true, buf.Bytes()})
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// AddMetadataToHashSuffix modifies the current hash suffix to include metadata
|
|
// (format, filename, and time). Version 5 keys protect this data including it
|
|
// in the hash computation. See section 5.2.4.
|
|
func (sig *Signature) AddMetadataToHashSuffix() {
|
|
if sig == nil || sig.Version != 5 {
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
if sig.SigType != 0x00 && sig.SigType != 0x01 {
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
lit := sig.Metadata
|
|
if lit == nil {
|
|
// This will translate into six 0x00 bytes.
|
|
lit = &LiteralData{}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Extract the current byte count
|
|
n := sig.HashSuffix[len(sig.HashSuffix)-8:]
|
|
l := uint64(
|
|
uint64(n[0])<<56 | uint64(n[1])<<48 | uint64(n[2])<<40 | uint64(n[3])<<32 |
|
|
uint64(n[4])<<24 | uint64(n[5])<<16 | uint64(n[6])<<8 | uint64(n[7]))
|
|
|
|
suffix := bytes.NewBuffer(nil)
|
|
suffix.Write(sig.HashSuffix[:l])
|
|
|
|
// Add the metadata
|
|
var buf [4]byte
|
|
buf[0] = lit.Format
|
|
fileName := lit.FileName
|
|
if len(lit.FileName) > 255 {
|
|
fileName = fileName[:255]
|
|
}
|
|
buf[1] = byte(len(fileName))
|
|
suffix.Write(buf[:2])
|
|
suffix.Write([]byte(lit.FileName))
|
|
binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(buf[:], lit.Time)
|
|
suffix.Write(buf[:])
|
|
|
|
// Update the counter and restore trailing bytes
|
|
l = uint64(suffix.Len())
|
|
suffix.Write([]byte{0x05, 0xff})
|
|
suffix.Write([]byte{
|
|
uint8(l >> 56), uint8(l >> 48), uint8(l >> 40), uint8(l >> 32),
|
|
uint8(l >> 24), uint8(l >> 16), uint8(l >> 8), uint8(l),
|
|
})
|
|
sig.HashSuffix = suffix.Bytes()
|
|
}
|